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Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?
TIMOTHY BESLEY London School of Economics and Political Science
MARTA REYNAL-QUEROL Universitat Pompeu Fabra
This paper uses a unique data set on over 1,400 world leaders between 1848 and 2004 to investigatedifferences in educational qualifications between leaders who are selected in democracies andautocracies. After including country and year fixed effects, we find that democracies are around
20%more likely to select highly educated leaders. This finding is robust to a wide range of specifications,
choices of subsamples, controls, and ways of measuring education and democracy.
This paper takes a novel perspective on the com-parison of democratic and autocratic systemsby looking at the educational attainment of the
leaders who are selected. It investigates this using a
unique data set that we have assembled on a core sam-
ple of 1,468 leaders in 197 countries who held office
between 1848 and 2004. The paper’s main finding is
that democratic systems are around 20% more likely
to select highly educated leaders.
Figure 1 previews our core finding by showing the
proportion of highly educated leaders (measured by
whether the leader has a graduate qualification) in the
world, beginning in 1874, differentiated by whether a
country is classified as autocratic or democratic accord-
ing to the Polity IV data set.1 This figure shows that
the proportion of highly educated leaders is consis-
tently higher in democracies than in autocracies over
the entire sample period. We will demonstrate in the
paper that this finding is robust to a wide range of
empirical methods, specifications, choices of subsam-
ples, controls, and ways of measuring education and
democracy.
The paper contributes to a growing empirical lit-
erature on political selection—examining how politi-
cal systems determine the characteristics of politicians
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1 We discuss the definitions of these variables and sources in greater
detail later.
who are chosen.2 Education is a particularly interest-
ing aspect of political selection in view of the strong
correlation found between educational attainment and
earnings, which is consistent with education either en-
hancing skills or signaling ability. Education is also
strongly correlated with civic engagement. Education
is thus a compelling indicator of a leader’s quality.
This paper also adds to the large cross-country empir-
ical literature comparing democracies and autocracies.
The focus of that literature hasmainly been onwhether
being a democracy enhances a country’s economic per-
formance, particularly growth. Early contributions to
the cross-country literature include Przeworski and
Limongi (1993) and Barro (1996), who conclude that
the correlation between democracy and growth is weak
and not robust. However, a recent panel data analy-
sis by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) based on
within-country estimates of permanent transitions, i.e.,
those where democracy is consolidated, finds that, on
average, democratization is associated with a 0.5 to 1
percentage point increase in the annual growth rate.
This finding is broadly consistent with Persson and
Tabellini (2009)’s novel econometric approach, which
also finds support for the proposition that persistent
democracy is associated with an improvement in eco-
nomic performance. In a similar vein, Aghion, Alesina,
and Trebbi (2008) show that democracy is correlated
with improved performance of advanced sectors, i.e.,
those that are closer to the technological frontier.
Models of the association between democratic tran-
sition and economic performance, such as Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006), have generally focused on
how democratization affects policy makers’ incentives.
However, democracy might also affect the character-
istics of policy makers who are chosen, as one might
expect following the citizen-candidate framework de-
veloped by Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996). In linewith this, there is persuasive evi-
dence that political selectionmatters for policy choice.3
And this is also consistent with the finding in Jones and
Olken (2005) that having a leader who dies in office
is correlated with a country’s subsequent economic
growth.
2 See, for example, Galasso and Nannici (2011) on Italy and Ferraz
and Finan (2009) on Brazil. See Besley (2005) for a discussion of
political selection issues in general.
3 See, for example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) and Pande
(2003) for evidence from India, where reservation for lower caste
groups and women has been used to change the makeup of the
political class.
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Interest in selection issues is not confined to political
leadership. Recent accounts of corporate performance
similarly place weight on charismatic chief executive
officers (CEOs) and the way in which they shape cor-
porate strategies. Indeed, Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
argue that the data can be described in terms of CEO
“fixed effects” indicative of management styles. A
number of papers have observed that random shocks to
CEOs affect firmperformance, consistentwith the view
that the identity of leaders matter—see, for example,
Johnson et al. (1985) and Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzales,
and Wolfenzon (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we discuss some background the-
oretical issues to motivate and interpret the empirical
analysis. In the third section, we introduce the data.
The fourth section presents the core empirical results.
The fifth section looks at the occupational backgrounds
of leaders, with a focus on the importance of military
leaders in autocracies. In the sixth section, we present
a range of extended results that assess the robustness
and interpretation of the baseline findings. The seventh
section concludes.
THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES
A reasonable starting point for a discussion of political
selection is to suppose that citizens of any country pre-
fer to be governed by an honest and competent leader.
In the languageof political science, honesty and compe-
tence are valence issues. But measuring these qualities
directly is difficult, especially as, in practice, they are
multidimensional concepts rather being capturable in
a single measurable indicator. However, we will argue
that educational attainment is a good candidate as a
proxy for this. If the quality of policy makers matters,
then a key issue is how political institutions shape the
selection process.
Therefore, in what follows, we discuss three back-
ground issues that motivate our test linking a country’s
political institutions and the educational attainment of
its leaders. We begin by discussing why we might ex-
pect a leader’s educational attainment to be a signal of
honesty and/or competence. We then discuss political
selection in two parts: (i) the factors that shape the
quality of the candidate pool and (ii) determinants of
who from among the pool is likely to be successful.
In both of these cases, we discuss why a transition to
democracy may make a difference.
Does Education Matter for
Competence and Honesty?
Prevailing theoretical models and empirical evidence
suggests that the answer to this question is “yes.”
On the question of competence, there is a vast lit-
erature in economics that demonstrates a robust pos-
itive return to education in private market settings.4
Human capital theory sees this as reflecting how edu-
cation increases skills, thereby increasing productivity.
Skills that are valuable for employment in the private
sector may not transfer immediately to performance
as a policymaker. But there are certainly cases where
4 See Card (1997) for a review.
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we would expect this to be the case. For example,
the oratorical skills and the ability to master a com-
plex brief quickly, as well as the powers of persuasion
learned in the study and practice of law, provide an
obvious explanation of the predominance of lawyers
in politics. So skills learned while training as a lawyer
seem likely to constitute transferable human capital.
The alternative view of education is a signaling theory
where individuals become educated in order to demon-
strate to prospective employers that they are able. This
view would also lead us to expect more educated lead-
ers to bemore competent, so that education could serve
as a signal for competence.
It is also reasonable to posit a link between edu-
cational attainment and public-spiritedness. There is
empirical evidence that more educated individuals are
also more civic-minded. For example, they contribute
more to public causes.5 A human capital interpretation
of this finding would suggest that part of the skill set
learned in education is an appreciation of the needs
of others. Moreover, education would have a central
role in the production of social capital. Here, we would
expect higher educational attainment in a leader to be
an indicator of greater civic-mindedness.
The Candidate Pool
One way in which political institutions could affect the
quality of candidates is through affecting the pool of
citizens who are available for public office.
Formal legal restrictions onwho can become a leader
are generally minimal. But that does not mean that
entry is guaranteed to be free and open. Even in a
democracy, candidates may face significant financial
costs of running a campaign and/or may be required
to go through a demanding nomination process.6 Po-
litical networks often play a filtering role, and political
parties are frequently at the heart of these. Parties vary
significantly in the formal and informal procedures that
they use to regulate candidate entry.
In autocracies, access to the candidate pool is often
closed. For example, monarchies usually require some
form of link by marriage or bloodline to be in the pool.
And leaders inmilitary juntas or one-party states rarely
specify in any formal sense who is in the pool. Running
for leadership positions is generally kept away from
the public eye for fear that any contest could look like
a sign of weakness or fragmentation. Overall, entry
barriers to the candidate pool seem to be higher in
nondemocratic settings.
Another key issue affecting candidate entry con-
cerns the rewards available in office or elsewhere.
Higher outside rewards in alternative occupations will
generally deter entry in any political system. And
returns to talent tend to be higher in market-based
5 See Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004) for
interesting studies on the link between education and citizenship.
6 In the case of democratic policy making, the citizen-candidate
approach of Osborne and Slivinski (2006) and Besley and Coate
(1997) assumes a small cost of becoming a candidate, which can be
interpreted in this way.
economies. Moreover, because market development
is greater in countries that are democratic, we might
expect this to make it more difficult, on average, to
attract the most competent people into the candidate
pool in democracies.
Office rewards may matter too. In some countries,
mainly autocracies, being a leader is dangerous, with
a constant threat of assassination. This may act as a
deterrent to good candidates. Illicit rewards from cor-
ruption may also play a role in attracting dishonest
leaders. Because checks and balances are stronger in
democracies, this motive is likely to play less of a role
in this case.
To summarize: there are a number of factors that
shape the candidate pool, and these are likely to be
systematically related to the structure of political in-
stitutions. Democracies should, on the whole, have a
wider pool of candidates to choose from.
Being Selected
The second important facet of political selection con-
cerns who is picked from among the available pool of
candidates.
In a democracy, this is achieved by holding an elec-
tion, either directly, as in a presidential system, or in-
directly as in a parliamentary democracy. Whether this
selection occurs on the basis of competence or hon-
esty is moot. For example, ideological predispositions
among voters could prevent them from voting on the
basis of honesty or competence. Campaigning could
also affect the outcome. And it is not even clear that
the leader is who matters in a party-based system—
voters may prefer to look at the senior leadership team,
rather than just the leader, and the best leader does not
always have the best team.
In a nondemocratic setting, it is even less clear cut
that the most honest or competent candidate will be
chosen fromamong the pool of available leaders. Lead-
ers may be prized more for their loyalty, ability to
engage in strategic manipulation, or commitment to
a specific ideology. In military dictatorships, selection
may be based on military standing rather than pol-
icy competence. And in monarchies, selection is based
mostly on birthright, making leadership qualities even
less relevant.
Information provision may also affect selection. Me-
dia freedom is generally much greater in democra-
cies, which means that potential leaders are subject to
greater scrutiny. This will favor the selection of leaders
with more “popular appeal”, which does not always
correspond to policy making competence or honesty.
Summing Up
Pulling this discussion together, there are good theo-
retical grounds for thinking that democracies will tend
to promote honesty and competence among leaders.
And to the extent that this is captured in educational
attainment, we should expect to observe a positive cor-
relation between the educational attainment of leaders
and democracy. However, there are sufficient caveats
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to make us wary of arguing that the link between edu-
cation of leaders and democracy is clear-cut in theory.
This motivates the need for an empirical investigation.
DATA
To identify the political leader in each country and
year, we use the Archigos data, which we supplement
using Ludwig (2002) and our own supplementary data
collection.7 In most cases, identifying the leader in a
country in a given year is clear and uncontroversial.
Two simple rules are generally followed: (i) in parlia-
mentary regimes, the prime minister is coded as the
leader, whereas in presidential systems, it is the presi-
dent; (ii) in communist states, the chairman of the party
is coded as the effective leader. We obtain a sample of
around 2,000 leaders. But our desire to include con-
trols in the following regressions and concerns about
the quality of some of the information mean that the
sample that we use in the core regressions has just
over 1,100 observations. The Data Appendix details
precisely how the sample that we use is put together.
We have constructed a new data set on the educa-
tional attainment of each leader. In doing so, we follow
the eight-way classification of a leader’s highest edu-
cational attainment suggested in Ludwig (2002). The
bottom category is illiterate, with no formal educa-
tion, and there are only 2 leaders in our core data set
in this category. The next category classifies a leader
as literate but with no formal education; we have 40
leaders in that group. Category 3 is for leaders who
have grade/elementary/primary school education or
were taught by personal tutors, with 200 leaders rep-
resented. Next is category 4, which stands for lead-
ers with high/finishing/secondary education or trade
school and contains 129 observations. Special training
(beyond high school), such as mechanical, nursing, art,
music, or military school, is category 5 which contains
44 leaders. College-educated leaders compose category
6, which contains 646 leaders. Category 7 is for leaders
whohavequalifications fromagraduateor professional
school (e.g., master’s degree), of which there are 278
leaders. Finally, category 8 is for leaderswith doctorates
(e.g., a Ph.D.), of which there are 129.8
Our core educational attainment variable, which we
use throughout, is a dummy variable which is equal to
one if the leader is in either category 7 or 8, i.e., has
at least a postgraduate qualification. We will refer to
this variable as “Graduate Education.”We will test the
robustness of the core results to instead using a variable
that we call “College Education,” which is a dummy
7 Archigos is a data base on political leaders and transitions compiled
by Giacomo Chiozza, Jinhee Choung, Hein Goemans, and Kristian
SkredeGleditsch; seeGoemans,Gleditsch, andChiozza (2006, 2009).
It is available at www.prio.no.
8 These numbers are for the highest-quality data that we use in our
baseline sample. We have a larger sample about which we are less
confident, where the distribution of leaders is as follows: illiterate—
3 leaders; literate (no formal education)—58 leaders; grade/
elementary/primary school or tutors—228 leaders; high/finishing/
secondary/trade school—143 leaders; special training (beyond high
school)—48 leaders; college—703 leaders; graduate or professional
school—341 leaders; doctorate—148 leaders.
that is equal to one if the leader is any of categories
6, 7, and 8. For country-level educational attainment,
we will use the Barro and Lee (2010) data set and,
for a longer time period, the recently collected data of
Morrisson and Murtin (2010).
Our core measure of democracy is from the Polity
IV data base.9 These data measure democracy on three
core dimensions: how competitive and open the re-
cruitment of chief executives is; the extent to which the
chief executive is constrained institutionally; and how
competitive and regulated political participation is. The
main summary variable, called POLITY2 in the data,
ranges from minus 10 to plus 10. Following a long line
of research by economists, for example, Persson and
Tabellini (2008), our main variable classifies a country
as democratic if the variable POLITY2 is positive. We
will, however, explorewhether our results are robust to
considering alternative ways of classifying countries as
democratic or autocratic by using other cutoff levels of
the POLITY2 variable and the Boix andRosato (2001)
classification of democracy.
CORE RESULTS
Our core empirical specification is a linear probabil-
ity model. We will focus primarily on determinants of
within-country variation over time of the educational
attainment of leader l first selected to serve in country
c at date t. The estimated equation is then
ect = µc + µt + θdct + γxct + ηct, (1)
where ect is a measure of the educational attainment
of leader  in country c at date t, µc is a country fixed
effect, µt is a year dummy, and xct are other controls.
We cluster the standard errors by country to allow for
arbitrary within-country correlations in the errors.
Our main coefficient of interest is θ, which can be
read in the linear probability framework as the effect
of the country being classified as democratic on the
probability of selecting an educated leader. By includ-
ing country and year dummy variables in all specifica-
tions, we control for fixed country characteristics such
as history and culture that might affect leadership se-
lection and global macrotrends such as rising levels of
educational attainment.
In this baseline specification, we enter the democ-
racy variable in the year in which the leader is first
selected to hold office. This is important because our
hypothesis that political selection is at work implies
that institutions in place at the time of selection are the
determinant of the type of leader who takes office.
Given the length of the time series and the varied set
of countries, the only time-varying regressor that we
are able to control for without sacrificing too many ob-
servations is per capita income fromMaddison (2003).
Controlling for income is, however, important because
it could reflect opportunities for leaders outside of gov-
ernment. For a more limited sample of countries/time
periods, which we discuss later, we can also include
9 See Marshall and Jaggers (2005).
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measures of general educational attainment in a coun-
try. Given the lack of time-varying regressors available
to us, we check whether our results are robust to in-
cluding country-specific time trends. These will pick up
a variety of economic changes within countries.
The core results are in Table 1.
In column (1), we look at the relationship between
having a leader with a graduate qualification and
democracy, controlling only for income per capita
and country and year fixed effects. There is a positive
and significant correlation between democracy at the
time of selection and having a highly educated leader,
with a democracy being 22% more likely to have an
educated leader than an autocracy. The correlation be-
tween having a leader with a graduate degree andGDP
per capita is not significant.10 Column (2) shows that
this result is robust to including country-specific time
trends. In column (3), we estimate a conditional logit
model to recognize the discrete nature of the left hand–
side variable. The core finding of column (1) remains.
The literature on the prerequisites for democracy,
beginning with Lipset (1959), has emphasized the im-
portance of education for the sustainability of democ-
racy. These ideas have been further developed in
Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007). Such discus-
sions motivate why it is important to control for the
educational attainment of the population as a whole.
Themain constraint on doing so lies in data availability.
We use data from Morrisson and Murtin (2010),
which gives country-level educational attainment in
78 countries for the period 1870–2010. The measure
that we use is the average years of education of the
population aged over 15.11 Column (4) includes this
variable in our core regression. There is a significant
reduction in the sample size due to data availability—
from 1,146 to 956. However, the correlation between
democracy and whether a leader has a graduate degree
is essentially identical to that found in column (1). The
coefficient on the educational level of a country is not
significantly different from zero in this regression. Col-
umn (5) includes country-specific time trends alongside
country-level educational attainment. Column (6) re-
ports the results from running a conditional logit. In all
cases, the core finding—linking democracy and having
a highly educated leader—remains present.
Having data on education at the country level allows
us to look at the link between democracy and leader’s
education in a slightly different way by focusing on the
difference between the leader’s educational attainment
and that of the population as a whole. Thus, our left
hand–side variable will now be the years of education
of the leader minus the average years of education of
the population in that year.12 Column (7) of Table 1
10 A positive and significant correlation between a leader’s educa-
tional level and income per capita appears if country fixed effects
are removed. This is not suprising given the importance of cross-
sectional variation in the data and the rather permanent differences
in income per capita between countries.
11 The raw data provide information for every decade, and we use
linear interpolation in order to have annual data.
12 To construct this, we need to impute a number of years of educa-
tion to correspond to the eight categories of educational attainment
shows that the educational distance of the leader from
the population is on the average 1.5 years larger in
democracies than in autocracies. Column (8) repeats
this regression with country-specific time trends also
included.
Columns (9) and (10) repeat the specifications in
columns (4) and (7), controlling for country-level ed-
ucational attainment using the Barro–Lee education
variables and the Penn World tables data to control
for income per capita. This increases the sample of
countries for which education data are available and
improves the reliability of the income data. However,
a price is paid in terms of having a more restricted
sample period, which is now only after 1960. The sim-
ilarity of the results to what we found with Morrison
and Murtin (2010) data is striking. Moreover, the core
column (1) finding is robust. All in all, this makes us
confident that omitting country-level education data is
not a significant issue.13
Taken together, these results paint a consistent pic-
ture suggesting that democracies indeed feature more
educated leaders.Moreover, our core results are robust
to controlling directly for the educational attainment
in the population as a whole and the method of estima-
tion.
OCCUPATIONAL SELECTION
In this section, we explore how our core finding is re-
lated to the previous occupation of leaders.We explore,
for example, whether selecting a more educated leader
is just a proxy for selecting leaders from specific occu-
pational groups. We will also relate our results to two
often-madeobservations about political leadership: the
prevalence of lawyers in democracies and military pro-
fessionals in autocracies.
This exercise is based on data that we have collected
on the occupational background of leaders in our sam-
ple. We have collected this information for 1809 lead-
ers using the same sources we use for the education
variables.14 We classify leaders into the following broad
categories: royalty, civil servant, professor, scientist,
military professional, and businessman. It is of course
debatable whether being a member of the royalty is
really an occupation but, given their prevalence in the
data, we need to assign such people to a group and they
in our data on leaders. We do so following the conventions of Mor-
risson and Murtin (2010). They consider six years of schooling as
primary school completed; six more years of schooling as secondary
school completed; and four more years of schooling as higher edu-
cation completed. On this basis, we compute the years of education
of our leaders as follows: illiterate (no formal education)—0 years;
literate (no formal education)—2 years; grade/elementary/primary
school or tutors—6 years; high/finishing/secondary/trade school—12
years (+6); special training (beyond high school), such asmechanical,
nursing, art, music, ormilitary school—16 (+4) years; college—16 (+4)
years; graduate or professional school (e.g., master’s degree)—18
years (+2); doctorate (e.g., Ph.D.)—20 years (+2).
13 The results are also robust to including measures of the distri-
bution of educational attainment in the population from the two
country-level education data sets that we used.
14 Ludwig (2002) also provides such information, but only for 1,166
leaders in our sample. Our variable and his agree in all but a very











TABLE 1. Democracy and Education: Baseline Results
OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Educational Educational Graduate Educational
Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Distance Distance Degree Distance
Democracy 0.22∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 1.98∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.5) (0.06) (0.28) (0.05) (0.06) (0.34) (0.39) (0.51) (0.07) (0.451)
Log (GDP per capita) −0.01 −0.14 −0.16 −0.02 −0.17 −0.01 0.51 −0.90 −0.04 0.20
(0.06) (0.09) (−0.36) (0.08) (0.11) (0.45) (0.61) (1.00) (0.07) (0.82)
Average years of education −0.03 −0.014 −0.17 −1.62∗∗∗ −1.22
(0.03) (0.08) (0.23) (0.30) (0.56)
Average years of education 0.01 −0.97∗∗∗
(population over age 25) (0.04) (0.33)
Country-specific time trends No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Sample period 1848–2004 1848–2004 1848–2004 1870–2004 1870–2004 1870–2004 1870–2004 1870–2004 1960–2004 1960–2004
Observations 1,146 1,146 956 821 821 777 821 821 611 611
R 2 0.3788 0.4703 0.3767 0.4445 0.5660 0.6233 0.4454 0.5885
Notes: All specifications include country and year dummies. All OLS regressions are reported with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The dependent variable Graduate Degree is a dummy that has value 1 if the leader has a graduate degree and zero otherwise. Democracy is a dummy variable that has value 1 if the
polity2 score is higher than 0, and 0 otherwise. The full sample is a panel of 197 countries: 1848–2004. Each observation is for the first year the leader is selected. The Democracy and Per
Capita Income variables are measured in the first year the leader is selected. Average Years of Education is the average years of schooling in the total population over 15, interpolated,
from Morrisson and Murtin (2010). The Average Years of Education (population over age 25) is the average years of schooling in the total population over 25, interpolated, from Barro and
Lee (2001) for the sample from 1960 onward (original variable is tyr25). The Educational Distance variable is explained in the text.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
557
Do Democracies Select Educated Leaders? August 2011
FIGURE 2. Distribution of Occupations of Leaders
rarely appeared to have had other careers. We have a
category “other” as the residual group.
Figure 2 shows how the occupational structure of
leaders has changed over time. There is a striking,
but unsurprising, decline in the importance of royalty
over time. Alongside this, there is a concomitant rise in
professions such as lawyers, professors, and scientists.
Given that entry into such groups often requires edu-
cation, this finding is, at the level of casual empiricism,
consistent with our core finding.
Figure 2 also illustrates that leaders with previous
careers in the military are an important phenomenon
in our data, reflecting the fact that many dictatorships
are organized by the military. This raises the question
of whether our results are driven by this group, because
36%of nonmilitary leaders have a graduate-level qual-
ification, compared to just 4% of military leaders.15 We
will explore this issue later.
We will begin by examining the correlation between
being selected in a democracy and the leader’s occu-
pation. We will then check whether the correlation
between education and democracy holds if we control
directly for the leader’s prior occupation.
The first three columns of Table 2 show that there is a
strong correlation between a leader’s previous occupa-
tion and whether or not a country is democratic at the
time of his or her selection. In column (1) of Table 2,
the left hand–side variable is a dummy indicating
whether the leader was a lawyer. The column shows
15 That said, it is instructive to observe that 8% of military leaders
in democracies have a graduate degree, compared to only 2% of
military leaders in autocracies.
that, after controlling for country and year dummies, a
democracy is 11% more likely to select a lawyer as its
leader.16 In column (2) our left hand–side variable is a
dummy indicatingwhether a leader is either a professor
or a scientist. Here, we find that a leader selected in
a democracy is 7% more likely to be in this occupa-
tional category. These findings are consistent with our
baseline finding that democracies selectmore educated
leaders.
Column (3) shows that a leader who has had a career
as a military professional prior to becoming a leader is
35% less likely to be selected in a democracy compared
to an autocracy. Again this result makes sense given
our previous core finding; 39% of leaders who are se-
lected in autocracies have had careers in the military,
compared to only 9% of those in democracies.
Our results could thus be interpreted not as evidence
for the selection of leaders based on education, but
for how political networks change with democratiza-
tion and bring people from different occupations into
power. One way to look at whether this is the case
is to repeat the analysis of Table 1 while controlling
for occupation. This is not entirely convincing, as oc-
cupation is endogenous. But it is still interesting to
know whether education matters “independently” of
occupational background. In column (4) of Table 2,
the left hand–side variable is whether a leader has a
graduate education, and on the right-hand side, we
include dummy variables for three core occupational
16 On average, 30% of democratic leaders are lawyers, compared to
15% of autocratic leaders.
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TABLE 2. Democracy, Military Professionals, and Education
Professor/ Military Graduate Graduate Graduate
Lawyer Scientist Professional Degree Degree Degree
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy 0.11∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Democracy × Military Professional −0.08
(0.09)
Military Professional −0.26∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Lawyer 0.11∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Professor/Scientist 0.08 0.06 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log (GDP per capita) −0.01 0.01 −0.11 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,168 1,131 1,131
R 2 0.2835 0.2907 0.4723 0.4109 0.4269 0.4276
Notes: All specifications include country and year dummies. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at the
country level in parentheses. The sample is a panel of 197 countries: 1848–2004. Each observation is for the first year a new
leader is selected. The Democracy and Per Capita Income variables are measured in the first year that the leader is selected.
Military Professional is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was in the military before holding office. Lawyer is a dummy that
is equal to one if the leader was a lawyer before holding office. Professor/Scientist is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the leader was
a professor or scientist before holding office.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
categories as controls.17 We find that leaders who
have been military professionals are 26% less likely to
have graduate degrees, whereas lawyers are 11%more
likely. Perhaps a littlemore surprisingly, professors and
scientists are only 8%more likely to have graduate de-
grees, and the coefficient on this occupational dummy
is only weakly significant.
In column (5) we repeat the core specification of
Table 1 while including occupational dummies. The
size and significance of the coefficients on the occu-
pational dummies are essentially identical to those in
column (4). But being a democracy remains indepen-
dently important and is associated with a 12% higher
probability of having a graduate degree. So democracy
seems to select leaders on the basis of their education
over and above the information contained in their prior
occupation.
Finally, in column (6), we include an interaction term
between the dummies denoting whether a country is
classified as a democracy andwhether the leader’s prior
career was as a military professional. The coefficient
on this interaction term will tell us whether military
leaders selected in autocracies and democracies are sig-
nificantly different from each other in terms of their ed-
ucational attainment. This column shows that a leader
in a democracy is around 14% more likely to have
a graduate degree, whereas a military professional is
20% less likely. But there is no significant difference
17 In collecting our data, we took care to investigate and respect the
nature of qualifications by country for becoming a lawyer. In some
countries, such as the United States, all lawyers have been to law
school to obtain a master’s. However, this is not the case elsewhere.
between autocracies and democracies in terms of the
types of military professionals that they select. This
suggests that the reason that military autocracies select
less educated leaders is that they select from a less
educated pool rather than the way they choose leaders
within the pool of available candidates.
Thebottom line from this section is that occupational
selection does seem to be an important issue in the
way that democracies and autocracies select leaders.
However, selecting more educated leaders in a democ-
racy remains a feature of the data even when prior
occupation is controlled for.
ROBUSTNESS
We now assess the robustness of the core finding in a
variety of ways. We will also address some issues sur-
rounding the interpretationof the core empirical result.
Measuring Education
Table 3 considers three alternative ways of measuring
a leader’s educational attainment. The first column in
Table 3 considers having a college rather than a gradu-
ate education as the outcome variable. As the result in
column (1) shows, the core finding linking democracy
and a leader’s educational attainment is robust. That
said, the size of the effect is smaller than for a graduate
degree—the probability of being college-educated in a
democracy is only 12% higher than in an autocracy.18
18 All of the results in Table 1 are robust to using college education
rather than graduate education as the dependent variable.
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TABLE 3. Democracy and Education:
Alternative Education Measures
College Education Continuous Studied
Dependent Degree (from 1 to 8) Abroad
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Democracy 0.12∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.12) (0.04)
Log (GDP per capita) −0.04 −0.06 0.11∗∗
(0.05) (0.20) (0.05)
Observations 1,146 1,146 1,146
R 2 0.3649 0.3988 0.3834
Notes: All specifications include country and year dummies. The estimation method is
OLS. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. The sample is a
panel of 197 countries: 1848–2004. Each observation is for the first year a new leader
is selected. The democracy and per capita income variables are measured in the first
year that the leader is selected.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
In column (2) of Table 3, we measure educational
attainment as an indicator variable running from 1–
8, where each number corresponds to one of the eight
educational achievement categories for leaders that we
have collected. The result shows that there is still a
positive and significant correlation with being selected
in a democracy, worth about 0.6 on this education scale.
Column (3) picks up on a theme from Spilimbergo
(2009), who shows that students who study abroad in
democracies appear to promote democracy in their
countries of origin. Perhaps one feature of democracies
is also, therefore, that their leaders are more likely to
have received a foreign education. The result in col-
umn (3) of Table 3, where the dependent variable is
a dummy variable indicating whether the leader has
studied abroad, shows that this is indeed the case. A
leader selected in a democracy is 12% more likely to
have studied outside the country.19
Measuring Democracy
Table 4 looks at the effect of varying our measure of
democracy. In column (1), we disaggregate the democ-
racy variable into a series of dummy variables corre-
sponding to the POLITY2 measure lying in different
numerical ranges, with the omitted category being a
democracy score lying between minus 10 and minus 6.
The regression reported in column (1) shows that the
core result is essentially driven by a country having a
positive democracy score at the time when it selects
its leader. This effectively justifies the approach that
we have taken, where a single dummy variable for a
positive POLITY2 score was used.
Column (2) adds the average experience of democ-
racy since the country entered the sample (lagged by
19 As a further robustness check, we responded to the potential
criticism that we may have mismeasured the educational attainment
of lawyers given the different systems in which they are trained. Our
results are robust to excluding the sample of 277 leaders who are
classified as professional lawyers.
five years) as a regressor. One possibility is that po-
litical selection is a reflection of an emerging demo-
cratic culture rather than the institutions at the time
of leadership selection. The fact that this new regres-
sor is not significant goes against the idea that some
kind of emerging democratic tradition is driving the
results. Column (2) also controls for longer-term eco-
nomic trends by including the averageGDP level of the
past five years instead of the contemporaneous GDP,
in case high-frequency changes in GDP contain very
little signal about economic prospects. This variable is
also not significant.
The Polity IV data are not without critics. Hence,
we also check the robustness of our results to using a
different data set to measure democracy. This was orig-
inally due to Przeworski et al. (2000), but the version
that we use was updated by Boix and Rosato (2001).
The data code a country as democratic if its elections
are free and competitive, the executive is accountable
to citizens, and at least 50%of themale electorate is en-
franchised. These data cover the period between 1800
and 1999. Compared to the Polity IV categorization
of democracy, the Boix and Rosato (2001) measure
depends more heavily on political contestation, with
less weight being placed on political participation and
executive constraints.20 Column (3) of Table 4 confirms
that the results are robust to using this alternativemea-
sure. In column (4), we use the POLITY2 variable as a
continuous measure of democracy. Again, the core re-
sult linking democracy and leader education is robust.
We argued earlier that leaders may be discouraged
from standing for office by the prospect of forcible or
violent removal from office. Thus, a history of polit-
ical instability and violence could act as a deterrent
20 This definition of democracy is less permissive than the definition
from Polity IV. In our core sample, Boix and Rosato (2001) classify
200 country–year observations in which leaders are selected as auto-
cratic when the core Polity2 definition classifies them as democratic.
There are only 25 observations where Polity2 denotes a country as
autocratic when according to Boix and Rosato (2001) the country is
democratic.
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TABLE 4. Democracy and Education: Alternative Measures of Political Systems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Log (GDP per capita) 0.000 −0.01 −0.01 −0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Average GDP in the last 5 years −0.06
(0.06)
Average democracy (lagged by 5 years) 0.02
(0.20)
Democracy score: –5 to –1 0.06
(0.06)
Democracy score: 0 to 5 0.17∗∗∗
(0.07)




Democracy (continuous measure) 0.02∗∗∗
(0.004)
Average past political instability −0.37∗∗∗
(0.13)
Observations 1,145 1,038 1,090 1,146 1,085
R 2 0.3744 0.3867 0.3449 0.3761 0.3943
Notes: All specifications include country and year dummies. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at the
country level in parentheses. The sample is a panel of 197 countries: 1848–2004. Each observation is for the first year a new
leader is selected. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the leader has a graduate degree and zero
otherwise. The Democracy and Per Capita Income variables are measured in the first year that the leader is selected. Average
Democracy (lagged 5 years) is the average of the democracy variable of the country lagged by 5 years.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
to higher-quality leaders making themselves available.
And it is possible, also, that this history is negatively
correlated with being democratic, because autocratic
leaders are more susceptible to violent removal, given
the nature of their institutions. To examine this issue,
we use a measure of how frequently past leaders ex-
ited power via a coup, via a revolution, or by being
assassinated; the exact measure is the percentage of
previous leaders who have left power by such means.
This varies over timewithin a country as the experience
of leadership exit evolves. This variable is included in
column (5) of Table 4. In line with what we expected,
the coefficient on this variable is negative and signif-
icant, suggesting that instability of this form acts as a
deterrent to educated leaders taking office. However,
the sign and significance of democracy indicator at the
time of selection remains as in the core results.
Varying the Sample
We now show that the results hold up in various sub-
samples.
One general concern is that we have not been able
to track down educational attainment information for
all leaders in Archigos. There is perhaps a concern that
there is something special about the sample that we
have. Our baseline data used only our higher-quality
sample, for which we are confident in our assessment
of the educational attainment of leaders. By including
GDP, we are also restricting the sample. Even though
this is a potential concern, there is little evidence of
institutional differences in sample means across these
cases. Among those where we have good-quality in-
formation and GDP data, 60% are democracies. In
the sample with good-quality educational data and
no GDP data, this drops to 57%, which is the same
proportion as in the larger sample, where we are less
sure about educational attainment. It is perhaps not
too surprising, therefore, that the baseline result is ro-
bust when we expand the sample to include leaders for
whomwe are less sure about the quality of the data and
drop GDP from the regression. This is demonstrated
in column (1) of Table 5, which has more than 1,500
observations.
Column (2) of Table 5 shows that the baseline result
holds in the post–WorldWar II data, where the sample
of independent countries is larger.Column (3) excludes
Europe from the sample entirely. Again, the baseline
result is robust in sign and significance. Column (4)
looks only at the European sample and again finds the
same result.
The remainder of Table 5 splits countries according
to whether or not they belong to democracy’s “third
wave,” which we define as countries that made a per-
manent transition to democracy after 1980. These in-
clude Eastern European countries and some countries
in Latin America. Column (5) includes only third wave
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TABLE 5. Democracy and Education: Subsamples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democracy 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
Log (GDP per capita) −0.01 −0.00 0.05 0.02 −0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10) (0.06)
Sample Larger sample using lower quality Post-WWII Excluding Europe Third Non–Third
information and excluding (after Europe only Wave Wave
Log (GDP per capita) 1945)
Observations 1,529 867 786 360 450 696
R 2 0.3524 0.3980 0.4289 0.4730 0.4974 0.3911
Notes: All specifications include country and year dummies. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at the country
level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the leader has a graduate degree and zero
otherwise. Third Wave countries are defined as those that made a permanent transition to democracy after 1980.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
countries, whereas column (6) looks at the complement
of this set. Although the point estimates differ, they
are statistically indistinguishable from each other and
from the baseline result in Table 1. So it seems as if
these newly created democracies followed the pattern
of electing more educated leaders that we have found
in the data as a whole.
Taken together, this subsample analysis shows lit-
tle evidence of heterogeneity in the relationship be-
tween selecting a highly educated leader and being a
democracy.
Reverse Causation?
Finally, we address whether reverse causation could
explain our results. This would be the case if poorly
educated autocratic leaders tended to precede democ-
ratizations, whereas highly educated leaders tended to
be selected before democracy collapses.
One way to address this concern is consider the fol-
lowing “event study” representation of the data around
transitions to and from democracy. Here, we look at
the educational attainment of leaders prior to demo-
cratic/autocratic transitions to see if there is a pattern
before the transition takes place. Specifically, we look
at the mean educational attainment of the two lead-
ers before a transition and the two leaders afterwards.
And we look at this separately for transitions out of
autocracy and out of democracy.
The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3,
we see a jump in the educational attainment of leaders
around a transition to democracy. The magnitude of
this jump is about 20%, which is exactly in line with
the size of the regression coefficient. There is no sign
of a trend for the two leaders preceding the transi-
tion. In Figure 4, we see an abrupt fall in the leader’s
educational attainment after a transition to autocracy.
This is also of magnitude similar to the regression es-
timate. And there also seems to be little evidence of
the existence of a pretransition trend. Taken together,
these figures show that the education attainment of a
country’s leader changes only at the point of transition
FIGURE 3. Democratic Transitions
to democracy/autocracy, but not before the transition.
This suggests that the causal relationship runs from
democracy to a leader’s educational attainment and
not vice versa.
In Table 6, we look at the possibility that transi-
tions to/from democracy are related to the educational
level of the leader. In column (1), we show that the
core finding from Table 1 is robust to dropping the
169 leaders who came to power following a coup in
case their education level affected the probability of a
coup taking place. The core result on democracy and
education remains in both sign, size, and significance.
We now eliminate cases where there was an auto-
cratic or democratic transition in the year in which the
leader came to power. In such cases it may be difficult
to know for sure whether the leader in question was
causing the transition. We have a total of 44 leaders
who come to power in a year in which there was an
autocratic transition, and 52 leaders that came to power
in a year in which there was a democratic transition.21
21 These are the number of observations for which we also have in-
formation on per capita income to include in the regression.Without
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TABLE 6. Democracy and Education: Regime Transitions and Method of Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democracy 0.18∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Log (GDP −0.04 −0.01 0.003 −0.01 −0.01





Sample Omitting the 169 Omitting the 44 leaders Omitting the 52 leaders Full Full
leaders who come who come to power in who come to power in
to power following the year of a transition the year of a transition
a coup to autocracy to democracy
Observations 1,017 1,102 1,094 1,088 1,146
R 2 0.3961 0.3892 0.3929 0.3698 0.3849
Notes: All specifications include country and year dummies. The estimation method is OLS. Standard errors clustered at the country
level in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the leader has a graduate degree and zero
otherwise.
∗Significant at 10%; ∗∗significant at 5%; ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
FIGURE 4. Autocratic Transitions
Column (2) of Table 6 looks at what happens when
we drop the 44 leaders who came to power in the year
of an autocratic transition. Again, the core result is
robust. The regression reported in column (3) shows
that the core result is also robust to dropping the 52
leaders who came to power in the year of a democratic
transition. This indicates that the effect of democracy
on the selection of an educated leader persists even if
we drop all the data points for which the endogeneity
of the political regime may be of particular concern.
We have also constructed a variable labeled
“elected,” which indicates whether a leader came
to power through an election or through another
(nondemocratic) selection process. This indicator is set
including income per capita as a control, we would have 52 leaders
coming to power the same year of an autocratic transition and 68 in
the year of a democratic transition.
to zero for leaders who lead a democratic transition.
In column (4) of Table 6, we first use the variable
“elected” instead of the democracy dummy. This also
predicts selection of a more highly educated leader.
The coefficient on “elected” is similar in magnitude to
the coefficient on the democracy dummy.22
Finally, in column (5) of Table 6, we look at whether
a leader comes to power via regular means as defined
in the Archigos data set. We include this variable in
addition to whether Polity IV classifies the country as
democratic.23 The core finding linking democracy and
a leader’s education remains. In addition, we find that
regular entry is associated with a 12% greater chance
of a leader having a graduate degree.
Although none of these exercises can completely
rule out concerns about endogeneity of the political
regime with respect to the leader’s educational attain-
ment, they show no evidence of fragility in the core
finding. Indeed, the results in Table 1 are robust to all
of these exercises.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper presents robust evidence that political selec-
tion with respect to education differs between autoc-
racies and democracies. The evidence is drawn from a
wide range of countries overmore than 150 years and is
robust to a wide range of estimation methods, variable
definitions, and subsamples. The results suggest that
democratically elected leaders are around 20% more
22 Although, as we would expect, the variable “elected” and our
democracy dummy are highly correlated, we do have some leaders
who came to power in years in which the POLITY2 variable was
above zero (a democratic year), but they did not do so through an
election. We also have a few leaders who came to power with an
election that POLITY2 does not regard as democratic.
23 Archigos defines regular entry as being selected according to “the
prevailing rules, provisions, conventions and norms of the country.”
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likely to be highly educated than leaders chosen in
autocracies.
The results provide convincing evidence that there is
a difference between political institutions in the char-
acteristics of those selected to be leader. This further
fuels the impetus towards empirical investigation of
political selection.
It is not beyond doubt that having more educated
leaders as measured here increases the quality of gov-
ernment. However, given the large amount of evidence
of the importance of education in private and public
spheres, it would be surprising if therewere no relation-
ship between the leader’s education and the quality of
policymaking.24 Besley,Montalvo, andReynal-Querol
(n.d.) provide some evidence in this direction, showing
that economic growth after a leader’s death due to
accident or illness varies with the leader’s educational
attainment.
But further investigation of how far the quality of
government hinges on the characteristics of those that
are selected for high office remains an important and
challenging topic for future research.
DATA APPENDIX
Variable Definitions and Sources
Graduate Degree.Adummy that is equal to one if the leader
has a graduate degree. Sources: Lentz (1994, 1999); Britan-
nica Online Encyclopedia, Academic Edition (http://www.
britannica.com/); The Statesman’s Yearbook Online (http://
www.statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona Cen-
ter for International Affairs’ Political Leaders Biogra-
phies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documentation/
biografias_lideres_politicos); and other online sources, as
well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis.
Democracy. A dummy that is equal to one if the POLITY2
variable has a positive value in the year the leader is selected,
and zero otherwise. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2005).
Log (GDP per capita) (All tables and columns except
columns (9) and (10) of Table 1). Log of per capita income
measured in the year when the leader is selected. Sources:
Maddison (2003); Table 1, columns (9) and (10), PennWorld
Tables 6.2.
Average Years of Education. The average years of school-
ing in the total population over 15. Source: Morrisson and
Murtin (2009), measured in the year when the leader is
selected.
Average Years of Education (Population over Age 25). The
average years of schooling in the total population over 25,
interpolated, from Barro and Lee (2001) for the sample
1960 onward. The variable is measured in the year that
the leader is selected (original variable is tyr25). Source:
www.barrolee.com.
24 There is, however, a concern that the results presented here are
a reflection of the fact that educational systems improve under
democracies, making it only worthwhile to select educated leaders in
democracies. However, this does not seem to the case. We used the
age of the leader and the pattern of regime transitions to estimate
whether a leader was educated primarily in an autocracy or a democ-
racy. The relationship between democracy and having an educated
leader is essentially identical across the subsamples of leaders whose
education was acquired during democratic and autocratic periods.
College Degree. A dummy that has value 1 if the min-
imum education level of the leader is college, and zero
otherwise. Sources: Lentz (1994, 1999); Britannica On-
lineEncyclopedia,AcademicEdition (http://www.britannica.
com/); The Statesman’s Yearbook Online (http://www.
statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona Center
for International Affairs’ Political Leaders Biogra-
phies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documentation/
biografias_lideres_politicos); and other online sources, as
well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis.
Studied Abroad. A dummy variable that has value 1 if the
leader studied abroad and zero otherwise. Sources: Lentz
(1994, 1999); Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Academic
Edition (http://www.britannica.com/); The Statesman’s Year-
book Online (http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/about.
html); Barcelona Center for International Affairs’ Politi-
cal Leaders Biographies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/
documentation/biografias_lideres_politicos); and other on-
line sources, as well as individual biographies from Lexis-
Nexis.
Democracy Boix-Rosato. A dummy variable that has value
1 if the country is considered democratic following the defini-
tion in Przeworski et al. (2000). Taken at the year the leader
is selected. Source: Boix and Rosato (2001)
Average Political Instability.Percentage of past leaders who
lost power by irregular means (coups, revolutions, or assas-
sinations). Following Archigos definition of exit by irregular
means. Source: Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2006).
Occupational Dummy Variables. Military Professional,
Lawyer. Dummies that are equal to 1 if the leader was
in the military, or was a lawyer, immediately before hold-
ing office. Sources: Lentz (1994, 1999); Britannica On-
lineEncyclopedia,AcademicEdition (http://www.britannica.
com/); The Statesman’s Yearbook Online (http://www.
statesmansyearbook.com/about.html); Barcelona Center
for International Affairs’ Political Leaders Biogra-
phies (CIDOB) (http://www.cidob.org/en/documentation/
biografias_lideres_politicos); and other online sources, as
well as individual biographies from Lexis-Nexis.
Elected. A dummy that is equal to one if the leader was
elected in the first instance.Sources: Ludwig (2002) andLentz
(1994, 1999).
Regular Entry.A dummy variable that is equal to one if the
leader came to power via regular means as defined in the
Archigos dataset. Source: Goemans (2006).
Sample Construction
The Archigos project collects data from 1875 to 2004.25 It
provides information on the exact dates between which lead-
ers have been in power. For each state, Archigos identifies
the primary ruler, the way in which leaders entered and left
power, the post-tenure fate of the leader, and personal data
such as date of birth/death and gender. AsArchigos explains,
many countries havemore than one leader. In some cases, the
formal headship of state may be a ceremonial position, as in
many present-day European monarchies. Archigos attempts
to identify the actual effective ruler based on its knowledge
25 There are two datasets: the long one, which gives information
on leader–year–country, and the short one, which gives information
on leader–country. In the short dataset there are 95 leader–country
points that do not appear in the long dataset. We include these 95
points in the long dataset, and in the long format (leader–year–
country). These 95 country-leaders points correspond to the follow-
ing countries: Barbados, Bahamas, Belize, Brunei, Cape Verde, Ice-
land, Luxemburg, Maldives, Malta, Montenegro, Solomon Islands,
Suriname, Tibet, Transvaal, Zanzibar.
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of the particularities of each state. However, there are a
small number of exceptions based on theGleditsch andWard
(1999) sample. Thus, if a country is conquered or occupied
but is governed by an autonomous leader, then those leaders
are included in the data. This was the case, for example, in
Denmark between 1940 and 1943 or Estonia in 1940. This
creates a small number of inconsistencies with the Polity IV
data, which code such cases as regime transitions. For each
leader the Archigos data provide information on the start
and end date, creating a leader-spell. Because some leaders
have more than one spell in office, the same leader may have
more than one start date and end date.
We supplement data in Archigos using Ludwig (2002),
which includes all leaders from independent states who held
power as the “chief executive” for any length of time, mainly
for the period between 1900 and 2000. The data list some
leaders who were in office between 1848 and 1900. These
data are based on de facto leaders, i.e., those judged to
have the greatest political authority, with or without for-
mal titles or positions. For inclusion in his database, the
chief executive may share power with other branches of
government such as a legislature or council. However, they
are adjudged not to be sharing power equally with other
individuals, such as a junta. In other words, in his assess-
ment, the leader has to be “in charge.” In order to estab-
lish the list of leaders Ludwig (2002) uses Lentz (1999) as
well as the “Rulers” database from the geocities webpage
(http:// www.geocities.com/Athens/1058/rulers.html). To de-
cide whether real executive power was vested in a monarch,
president, or prime minister, his data also use Britannica
Online, the Library of the Congress Country Studies, and
a number of country level studies. The Europa World
Year Book for 1997, 1998, 1999 and Lexis–Nexis Academic
Universe were consulted for information on many late-
century leaders who were neglected by Lentz (1999) and
Britannica.
Using the sample of leaders established in this way, we
collected a new dataset on the education of leaders follow-
ing Ludwig (2002)’s criteria. Our data cover 1,672 leaders
of the potential set of 2,097 leaders identified by Archigos
and Ludwig (2002). For 1,468 leaders of the 1,672, we use
theEncyclopedia of Heads of States and Governments, Ency-
clopedia Britannica, Statesman’s Yearbook, and other online
sources, as well as individual biographies from Lexis—Nexis.
Ludwig (2002) provides information on the education of only
333 leaders.26 We used his data to cross-check our findings.
In a few cases, they were used to fill in the information on
education in cases where we could not find any information
ourselves. In completing this exercise, we were careful to
exclude honorary degrees obtained during or after a leader’s
spell in office.We separate our sample into high-quality data,
where we are confident in our assessment of a leader’s educa-
tional attainment, and a lower-quality sample, where we feel
that the sources are less secure. The lower-quality sample
contains information for an additional 204 leaders, taking
the sample size to 1,654 leaders. We collected information
on whether the leader was educated abroad from the same
sources as the basic education data.
We have a total of 197 countries for which a leader is listed
between 1848 and 2004, using the previous sources. We pick
one leader per year to give us a total of 2,097 leaders and a
total of 2,486 leader-spells in office. In cases where more than
one leader is in office in a given year, we focus on the leader
who was in office for the longest time period during the year.
26 We are grateful to Arnold Ludwig and Gregory Gunthner for
generously agreeing to make their data available to us.
In our core results in column (1) of Table 1, we have 1,146
leaders from 146 countries and data from 1872 to 2004. The
results in column (1) of Table 5 come from a sample of 1,529
leaders drawn from 161 countries over the period from 1848
to 2004 .
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